SPECIAL BRANCH REPORT: Military Rebellion of 15th January 1966

This is an incomplete Police Report on the official investigation into the
events of 15 January 1966, entitled:  “Military rebellion of 15th January
1966″.  It was prepared by Police Special Branch Interrogators based on
interviews with soldiers, other ranks and some officers who had been
arrested after the January 15, 1966 mutiny.  None of the soldiers and
officers involved had come to formal trial in a court-martial as of the time
of the July 29 1966 “counter-coup”. Indeed the fact they were not
court-martialed was one of the grievances listed by those officers who
carried out the unfortunate operations of July 28-August 1, 1966.

This draft was released to a highly restricted circulation of certain
persons in government and outside the country in very early August 1966 –
and then leaked.

The remainder of the report which allegedly implicated certain other persons
has apparently never been released widely to this day. I am told that it
exists.   I am on its trail – and shall publish it once I get a hold of it


Nowa Omoigui


1. Due to unforeseen circumstance it has not been possible, so far, to
inform the nation fully of events which took place in the Federation on 15th
January 66 at Lagos, Ibadan, and Kaduna, events which were directly
responsible for further military action on the 29th July 66.

2. It will be appreciated that events of this nature require prolonged,
painstaking investigation.  It is realized that the absence of legitimate
information on this subject has produced a flood of undesirable rumours and
speculation.  It is, however, pointed out that without thorough
investigation, the wisdom of any premature releases, unsupported by fact,
was questionable.

3. Investigations have not yet been completed but it is now possible to put
the nation, and the world, in possession of the facts so far collected.  The
civilian involvement and influence in the whole affair is not as far as
possible, included in this report.

4. It has been established that sometime during August 1965, a small group
of army officers, dissatisfied with political developments within the
federation, began to plot in collaboration with some civilians, the
overthrow of what was then the Government of the Federation of Nigeria.  The
plan which eventually emerged from their deliberations was that on a date
not yet decided at the time, the following action would be taken by troops
from selected units, led by the ringleaders of the plot:

a). The arrest of leading politicians at Lagos, Ibadan, Kaduna, Enugu and
Benin. The plan stipulated that wherever resistance was encountered, the
individuals concerned were to be killed.

b). The occupation of key points such as radio and TV stations, telephone
exchange and other public utilities, police headquarters and signal
installations, by carefully selected troops who were not, however, to be
informed in advance of the true nature of their operations.

c). The movement of troops and armoured fighting vehicles to Jebba and
Makurdi to hold the Benue and Niger Bridges with a view to preventing the
movement of any troops, opposed to the plotters’ aims, to and from the

d). The assassination of all senior army officers known to be in a position
to foil, successfully, the conspirators’ efforts to topple the governments
of the federation.

e). The eventual take-over of the machinery of government by the rebels.

5. Although the original plan stipulated that the action intended by the
plotters should take place, simultaneously, in all the Regional capitals, no
arrangements were made to implement these intentions in Benin and Enugu.

6. The date on which the plot was to be put into execution was decided by
several factors.  These include the return of the Premier of Northern
Nigeria from Mecca and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference held at
Lagos between the 11th and 13th January 66.  An additional factor was the
possibility that details of the plotters intentions might have leaked out,
necessitating early implementation of the plot.  In this manner, the night
of 14th to 15th January was finally selected.

7. The action which was well planned and conducted like a military operation
was, in its first stages efficiently carried out.

8. Immediately before “H” hour, which has been set for 2am on the 15th
January, a number of junior officers were taken into the confidence of the
ringleaders of the plot.  It is known that a number of these were reluctant
to comply with the wishes of the plotters. Confirmed information indicates
that it was made clear to these junior officers that those who were not with
the conspirators would be regarded as being opposed to them and might suffer
death as a consequence.

9. Non commissioned ranks involved in the night’s activities at Lagos,
Kaduna and Ibadan, were given no previous information of the true nature of
the action in which they were about to be engaged.

10. The activities of the rebels, commencing at 2am on 15th January 66,
resulted in the deaths of the following personalities:


a. Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister of the Federation of

b. Chief F. S. Okotie-Eboh, Finance Minister of the Federation.

c. Brigadier Z. Mai-Malari, Commander of the 2nd Brigade NA

d. Colonel K. Mohammed, Chief of Staff Nigerian Army

e. Lieut-Colonel A. C. Unegbe, Quartermaster General.

f. Lieut-Colonel J.T. Pam, Adjutant General, Nigerian Army

g. Lieut-Colonel A. Largema, Commanding Officer 4th Battalion Ibadan


h. S. L. Akintola, Premier of Western Nigeria


i. Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduana of Sokoto and Premier of Northern

j. Brigadier S. Ademulegun, Commander of the 1st Brigade NA

k. Colonel R. A. Shodeinde, Deputy Commandant, Nigerian Defence Academy

l. Ahmed Dan Musa, Senior Assistant Secretary (Security) to the North
Regional Government

m. Sergeant Duromola Oyegoke of the Nigerian Army

n. The senior wife of Sir Ahmadu Bello

o. The wife of Brigadier Ademulegun

11. In addition to the foregoing, four members of the Nigeria Police, one
junior NCO of the Nigerian Army, and an estimated number of six civilians
lost their lives during the night’s events.  One major of the Nigerian Army
was accidentally shot and killed at Ibadan on the 17th January 66, bringing
the total loss of life to twenty-seven.

12. Apart from the aforementioned killings, a number of political leaders
and civil servants were arrested by the plotters and detained in military
establishments at Lagos and Kaduna.  These included:

a. Sir Kashim Ibrahim – at the time Governor of Northern Nigeria

b. Alhaji Hassan Lemu – Principal Private Secretary to the Premier of
Northern Nigeria.

c. Aba Kadangare Gobara – Assistant Principal Private Secretary to the
Premier of Northern Nigeria.

d. B. A. Fani-Kayode – at the time Deputy Premier of Western Nigeria.



13. In August 1965, three officers, Major Okafor, Major Ifeajuna and Captain
Oji who were already dissatisfied with political developments in the
Federation and the impact of these developments on the Army,  held series of
discussions between them about the matter and set about the task of
searching for other officers who held views similar to their own and who
could, eventually, be trusted to join them in the enterprise of staging a
military coup d’Etat.

14. In September 1965, Major I. H. Chukwuka of Nigerian Army Headquarters
Lagos was persuaded to join the group of conspirators, followed in October
1965 by Major C. I. Anuforo, also of the Army headquarters. Major C. K.
Nzeogwu was brought in around that time through the efforts of Major
Anuforo, an old friend of both Majors Nzeogwu and Okafor.  Major Nzeogwu in
turn secured the support for the plan of Major A. Ademoyega who had worked
with him in the Nigerian Army Training College Kaduna.

15. By early November the recruiting activities of the group were completed
and an inner circle of conspirators emerged, consisting of the following

Major CK Nzeogwu

Major A. Ademoyega

Major EA Ifeajuna

Major CI Anuforo

Major IH Chukwuka

Major D. Okafor

Captain O. Oji

Planning for the execution of the plot started in earnest in early November
1965 at a meeting of the inner circle which took place in Major Ifeajuna’s
house in Lagos.

16. The plan which eventually emerged from their deliberations was broadly
as follows:

a. The arrest of VIPs at Kaduna, Ibadan, Lagos, Enugu and Benin.  The plan
stipulated wherever resistance to arrest was encountered, the individuals
concerned were to be killed

b. The occupation of vulnerable points such as Radio and TV stations,
telephone exchange, police signals installations, airfields and civilian
administrative establishments, by carefully selected troops who were not,
however, to be informed in advance of the purpose of their operations.

c. The movement of troops to Jebba and Makurdi to hold the Niger and Benue
bridges against any movement of troops opposed to the plotters’ aims, to and
from the North.

d. The killing of all senior army officers who were in a position to foil
successfully the conspirators efforts to topple the Governments of the
Federation and who resided in the areas of operations.

e. The eventual take-over of the machinery of Government by the Army.

17. Amongst the civilian VIPs scheduled for arrest, the following have been

a. The Prime Minister of the Federation

b. The Federal Finance Minister

c. The Premiers of Northern, Western, Midwestern and Eastern Nigeria.

18. Additional personalities scheduled to be arrested in Lagos were the

a. K. O. Mbadiwe

b. Jaja Wachuku

c. Inua Wada

d. Shehu Shagari

e. T. O. Elias

f. Ayo Rosiji

g. M. A. Majekodunmi

h. Mathew Mbu

i. R.A.O. Akinjide

j. Waziri Ibrahim

19. Other ranking politicians were to be placed in house arrest pending a
decision as to their disposal and eventual fate.

20. Events have shown that other political figures including the Deputy
Premier of Western Nigeria, the Finance Minister and the Governor of
Northern Nigeria were scheduled to be arrested.

21. The conspirators further decided that the following senior army officers
represented a threat to their plans and must be killed during the first
hours of the rebellion:

Brigadier Z. Mai-Malari       – Lagos

Brigadier S. Ademulegun       – Kaduna

Colonel K. Mohammed – Lagos

Colonel R. A. Shodeinde – Kaduna

Lt. Col. A. Largema – Ibadan

Lt. Col. A. C. Unegbe – Lagos

Lt. Col.  J.T. Pam – Lagos

NOTE:  Lt. Col. Largema was the CO of  4th Battalion NA stationed at Ibadan.
On 15th January 66, however, this officer was on temporary duty at Lagos,
staying at the Ikoyi Hotel

22. For the actual execution of the plan, three commanders were nominated,

a. Northern Nigeria  Major C.K. Nzeogwu

b. Lagos Area   Major E. A. Ifeajuna

c. Western Nigeria   Captain E. N. Nwobosi

 23. The latter officer was not a member of the inner circle and was not
approached until either the 13th or 14th January 66. He was, however, well
known to the conspirators who were certain that when the time came he could
be relied on to cooperate.

24. The execution of the plan was to take place in three areas only, i.e.
Kaduna, Ibadan and the Lagos area, although many of the participants
believed the insurrection to be nation wide.  It is a matter of established
fact that no violent action took place in either Benin City or Enugu.  It
has been suggested that these areas were spared because the plotters found
it impossible to recruit reliable co-conspirators in these regions.  None of
the officers has indicated under interrogation that any efforts to recruit
collaborators in either Benin or Enugu were made.  Indeed subsequent action
of some of the leading officers indicated collaboration with the then
Premier of Eastern region.

25. For the purposes of this report, the execution of the plan is dealt with
in three main sections, namely Lagos Area, Ibadan and Kaduna. Each section
is divided into incidents, showing the identities of officers and men


26. The execution of the plan commenced by the calling of a meeting late on
14 January 66 of the Lagos members of the inner circle and, for the first
time, of junior officers previously selected to take an active part.  A
number of those present had attended a cocktail party that very evening in
the house of Brigadier Mai-Malari in Ikoyi.  The following attended this
meeting which was held in the Apapa House of Major Ifeajuna:

 a. Major EA Ifeajuna

b. Major CI Anuforo

c. Major D Okafor

d. Major A. Ademoyega

e. Major IH Chukwuka

f. Captain O Oji

g. Captain GS Adeleke

h. Lt. G. Ezedigbo

i. Lt. BO Oyewole

j. 2/Lt. ES Nweke

k. 2/Lt. BO Ikejiofor

l. 2/Lt. NS Wokocha

m. 2/Lt. Igweze

27. Major Ifeajuna addressed the meeting on the subject of the deteriorating
situation in Western Nigeria to which, he contended, the politicians had
failed to find a solution.  He added that as a result the entire country was
heading toward chaos and disaster.  He next acquainted the junior officers
with the inner circle’s plans and asked them if they were prepared to assist
to put an end to this state of affairs. Major Ifeajuna claims that all
present pledged their support for his plans with the exception of Captain
Adeleke who was, however, later persuaded to join.  It was made clear to
these junior officers that those who were not with the conspirators would be
regarded as being opposed to them and might suffer death as a consequence.

28. When, at the end of the meeting, it was clear that all present were in
support of the rebellion, tasks and targets were issued as follows:

a. Abduction of the Prime Minister and the Federal Finance Minister:  Major
Ifeajuna, 2/Lt. B. Oyewole, 2/Lt. Ezedigbo

b. Killing of Colonel Mohammed and Lt. Col. Unegbe: Major CI Anuforo, 2/Lt
C. Ngwuluka

c. Killing of Brigadier Mai-Malari:  Major D. Okafor, Capt. O. Oji, 2/Lt. C.

d. Killing of Lt. Col. Pam:  Major IH Chukuka, 2/Lt. G. Onyefuru

e. Occupation of the Control Room at FT Police HQ Lion Building: 2/Lt NS

f. Occupation of P & T Telephone Exchange:  , Lt. PM Okocha, 2/Lt. CC

g. Occupation of N.E.T. Building:  2/Lt DS Nweke

But there were apparent last minute change of the plans as will be shown
later in this paper.

29. Troops selected for these various tasks were to be drawn from the
following units (all stationed or accommodated at Apapa and Dodan barracks,

a. No. 1 Signal Squadron

b. Camp – HQ 2 Brigade NA

c. Lagos Garrison Organization

d. The Federal Guard Unit

30. The Federal Guard Officers Mess at Ikoyi was named as the rallying point
for all teams on completion of their tasks.

31. All other officers and other ranks to be involved, either consciously or
unconsciously in the operations were called out for alleged Internal
Security operations between midnight and 0100 hours to allow time for the
issue of arms and ammunition and the provision of the necessary transport.
With the exception of other ranks of the Federal Guard, they were all
ordered to report to Headquarters of No. 2 Brigade NA in battle order, with
their arms. Ammunition was issued to them by Lt.  Okaka, assisted by Major
Ifeajuna, RSM Ogbu of Camp 2 Bde and others.

32. Officers and men moved off to their various assignments at around 0200
hours as planned.


33. The party charged with the abduction of the Prime Minister (PM) left HQ
2 Bde at approximately 0200 hours.  The following have been identified as
members of that group:


a. Major EA Ifeajuna (in command)

b. 2/Lt. G. Ezedigbo  (Federal Guard Unit)

c. 2/Lt. Oyewole  (2 Brigade Transport Company)


NA 84254    Cpl C. Madumelu

NA 18149591          L/Cpl . O. Achi

NA 18159447 S/Sgt. A. Ogbogara

NA 18150401 Sgt. L. Onyia

NA  500147 Sgt. BS Odunze

NA 18150392 Sgt. F Impete

NA  18150400 Sgt. I  Ndukaife

NA   1856 Sgmn. S. Onwuli

NA 18149817 Cpl. P. Okoh

NA 18149084 Cpl. U Eduok

NA  18150345 Cpl.  Z. Chukwu

NA 18150206 L/Cpl  FI Okonkwo

NA  3775 Sgmn  FN Chukwu

NA 18150443 L/Cpl RC Amadi

NA 18159121 WO II J  Onyeacha


NA  3339 Pte NA Evulobi

NA 18150137 L/Cpl  S. Kanu

NA 502724 WO II L. Okoye

NA 124643 WO I (RSM) J. Ogbu


NA 504299 Sgt. J. Nwakpura

NA503865 Sgt. B. Iberesi

NA 149820 Sgt. E. Okonkwo

NOTE:  The above named were not all, of necessity, directly involved in the
abduction of the PM.  A number of them operated on the premises of the
Federal Finance Minister, adjacent to the residence of the Prime Minister

34. The small convoy reached the Onikan roundabout at approximately 0230
hours and halted near the PM’s residence. Major Ifeajuna ordered all troops
to leave their vehicles and divided them into three groups with targets as


Major EA Ifeajuna – in command

Sgt. B. Iberesi

Sgt. J. Nwakpura

Sgt. BS Odunze

Cpl. P. Okoh

Cpl C. Madumelu

Sgmn  FN Chukwu

Sgmn. S. Onwuli

2/Lt. Oyewole


2/Lt. G. Ezedigbo  – in command

WO I (RSM) J. Ogbu

L/Cpl  FI Okonkwo

Cpl.  Z. Chukwu

Cpl. U Eduok

Sgt. F Impete

S/Sgt. A. Ogbogara

Sgt. I  Ndukaife

WO II L. Okoye


WO II J  Onyeacha – in command

L/Cpl RC Amadi

Pte NA Evulobi

L/Cpl  S. Kanu

Sgt. E. Okonkwo

35. The latter group was given the task of stopping and turning back all
vehicles approaching Onikan road. There is no record concerning their
instructions as to what action they were to take in the event of any of the
drivers refusing to obey the order to turn back.

36. The Major knocked on the gate and was answered by a policeman who was on
guard inside.  The Major identified himself as an Army Officer whereupon the
PC (Police Constable) granted them access.  The Major asked the PC how many
men were on guard with him and was told that there were six.  The Major then
ordered the PC to show where they could be found.  The PC agreed whereupon
the Major seized his rifle and passed it to one of his men.  The PC then led
the group to round up the remaining members of the Police guard. At the back
of the house, ie. at the creek side, they found a PC armed with a rifle and
accompanied by a Police dog.  The Major ordered the PC to surrender his
rifle, which he refused to do.  He was then hit in the face by Sgt. Odunze
whereupon he capitulated and surrendered his firearm.  Major Ifeajuna
ordered Sgt Odunze and Cpl. Okoh to stand guard over the PC and his dog with
orders to shoot both if they made an attempt to abscond or raise the alarm.
All the other members were disarmed and taken to the main gate where they
remained guarded by Sgt Iberesi and 2 others. They were all informed that
they would be shot if they attempted to escape or raise the alarm.

37. Major Ifeajuna and few of his men then approached the back entrance to
the Prime Minister’s residence having secured the police orderly, and the
stewards under arrest, and broke into the lounge and thence to the Prime
Minister’s bedroom.  A voice from the inside asked who was there.  The Major
replied by kicking the door open, entering the room and pointing his gun at
the Prime Minister and thereafter led out the PM wearing a white robe with
white trousers and slippers. The PM was then led away by Major Ifeajuna
along Awolowo Road where Ifeajuna had parked his car adjacent to the Onikan
swimming pool.


38. On arrival at the Onikan roundabout, at approximately 0230 hrs on 15 Jan
66, Major Ifeajuna divided his force into three groups as shown in para 34
of this report.  Major Ifeajuna and his group proceeded towards the PM’s
residence and 2/Lt Ezedigbo took his men to the compound of the Finance
Minister. When they arrived at the front gate, they found this locked and
were compelled to gain access by jumping over the wall.  Inside they found a
number of civilian guards, about 5, who were armed with bows and arrows.
These offered no resistance and were disarmed and placed under guard.  At
least one policeman was encountered in the compound.  He too was disarmed
and escorted to the 3-Ton truck by RSM J. Ogbu.

39. 2/Lt Ezedigbo then attempted to open the front door but found this also
to be locked.  He broke one of the panes of glass in the door with his SMG
but even failed to open the door which he finally broke down by kicking it
with his boot.  He then entered accompanied by the following other ranks:

WO II L Okoye

Sgt. I Ndukaife

Sgt. E. Okonkwo

Cpl. U. Eduok

Sgt. F. Impete

Before entering 2/Lt Ezedigbo ordered his men to walk quietly and to make no
noise, a rather superfluous caution considering the noise which must have
been made when the door was broken open.  They mounted the stairs to the
first floor.  Having arrived there, the 2/Lt posted one man on the balcony
and 3 on the landing.

40. The officer then shouted twice “Okotie-Eboh”, come out”.  When this met
with no response he entered a bedroom where he found the Minister dressed
only in a loin cloth.  He ordered the Minister to precede him down the
stairs, and the Minister was escorted to the 3-Ton lorry.  Rumors that the
Minister was beaten and otherwise ill-treated on the way to the vehicle have
been stoutly denied by all who took part in the operation.

41. Whilst the Finance Minister was being loaded into the 3-Tonner, the PM
was escorted from his house and placed into Major Ifeajuna’s car.  2/Lt
Ezedigbo joined Ifeajuna whilst the ORs (other ranks) re-entered their
respective vehicles.  The convoy then moved off to the  Federal Guard
Officers’ Mess, stopping en route at a point in Ikoyi where Major Ifeajuna
and 2/Lt. Ezedigbo killed Brig. Mai-Malari. (editors comment:  Maimalari had
escaped from the team that had been sent to kill him at home)


42. Meanwhile Major CI Anuforo, assisted by 2/Lt. C. Ngwuluka  and the
following other ranks:

NA 173629  WO II B. Okugbe – No. 1 Signal Sqn

NA 18149383  Sgt. J Oparah – No. 1 Signal Sqn

NA 1641      Cpl. C. Egwim – No. 1 Signal Sqn

NA 18149792  Cpl. E. Nwoke – No. 1 Signal Sqn

NA 18150530  L/Cpl. J Nwankpa – No. 1 Signal Sqn

NA 18151259  Pte C. Unegbu – Military Hospital, Yaba

proceeded in the two private cars of Anuforo and Ngwuluka to No. 1, Park
Lane Apapa, the residence of Colonel K. Mohammed.  This was then being
guarded by unarmed nursing orderlies of a Field Ambulance stationed in

43. On arrival Major Anuforo ordered all his party to leave the cars, which
had stopped some distance from the house.  They then advanced towards the
house led by Major Anuforo.  They were challenged by Pte L. Onyegbule, then
on sentry-go.  Major Anuforo told the sentry to “shut up” and to put up his
hands. The Major then gave orders that the sentry and the other 3 members of
the guard be banded together in one place in the custody of Pte. C. Unegbu,
who although a member of a medical unit, was then bearing arms.

44. Major Anuforo then went to the front door of the house and knocked.  It
would appear that he received an answer, because he was heard shouting  “You
first come out and see who is knocking”. With the Major at this stage was WO
II B. Okugbe. When he received no further answer to his knocking, Anuforo
ordered his men to cock their weapons.  He then kicked open the door and
entered accompanied by Cpl. E. Nwoke, WO II Okugbe and Cpl Egwim.

45. The house was searched until the Colonel was found, in night attire, in
his bedroom.  The Colonel was forced out of the house by Major Anuforo and
the other ranks who had accompanied him, and put into Anuforo’s car.  It is
believed that before being put into the car, the Colonel’s wrists were tied
with a rifle sling which was still in place when later, his body was
discovered along the Abeokuta road.

46. Before leaving, Major Anuforo instructed the Colonel’s guard to return
to their unit and not to discuss what they had seen with anyone.  Sgt. J
Oparah and Cpl. E. Nwoke could not get into the car of Major Anuforo because
of the presence of the Colonel and were odered to follow on foot to the
house of Lt. Col. Unegbe, situated on Point road, Apapa, not very far away.

47. On arrival at Lt. Col. Unegbe’s house, Major Anuforo entered the house
alone.  They heard SMG fire inside the compound and were later ordered to
bring out the dead body of the Lt. Col.

48. Whilst the men were inside collecting Lt. Col. Unegbe’s body, Col.
Mohammed was compelled to leave the car by Major Anuforo.   The latter told
the Colonel to say his prayers as he was going to be shot. The Colonel did
not plead for mercy or remonstrate in any other manner, but quietly prayed
until he was shot in the back by Major Anuforo, using his SMG.

49. Colonel Mohammed’s corpse was stowed into the boot of Major Anuforo’s
car while the body of Lt. Col. Unegbe was placed on the floor in the back of
the car. Anuforo and his men then entered the vehicle which was driven
straight to the Federal Guard Officers’ Mess.  At the Mess the two bodies
were unloaded on the ground.


50. Major Chukuka assisted by 2/Lt G Onyefuru and the other ranks

NA 160152    Sgt. NN Ugongene – No. 1 Signal Squadron

NA 18150196  Sgt. H. Okibe – No. 1 Signal Squadron

NA  154544   Sgt. B. Anyanwu – Camp – HQ 2 Bde NA

NA 403298    Sgt. L. Egbukichi – Army HQ (LGO)

NA  18150416  Sgt. P. Iwueke – HQ 2 Bde NA

had by then accomplished the arrest of Lt. Col. JY Pam and was being guarded
inside a landrover in the Mess premises.  Majors Chukuka and Anuforo held a
brief discussion after which both Majors entered the Landrover.  The driver
was ordered to proceed to Ikoyi.

51. At a point inside Ikoyi the landrover was stopped and both Majors
descended.  Major Anuforo ordered Lt. Col. Pam to leave the vehicle, which
he did.  Major Anuforo then spoke to him and told him that he was going to
be killed and would do well to say his prayers first. Lt. Col. Pam pleaded
but Major Anuforo remained adamant, stating that he was carrying out orders.
Then without warning Major Anuforo fired a burst from his SMG into Lt. Col.
Pam’s body killing him on the spot.

52. Major Anuforo then ordered the NCOs in the landrover to come down and
load the dead body into the vehicle.  The men, who were shocked and
frightened by the killing were reluctant to comply with this order and
refused to leave the vehicle until Major Anuforo pointed his SMG at them and
threatened to kill them unless they did as they were told.  They then obeyed
and loaded the corpse.  The party then drove back to the Federal Guard
Officers Mess where the body was off-loaded and placed alongside the bodies
of Col. Mohammed and Lt. Col. Unegbe.


53. The assassination of Brigadier Z. Mai-Malari as originally conceived in
the conspirators Master plan failed.

54. Major DO Okafor and Captain Oji were present at HQ 2 Bde when troops
were being mustered and issued with arms and ammunition. When these
arrangements had been completed these two officers entered Major Okafor’s
personal car accompanied by the following ORs from No. 1.


NA 500611     L/Cpl B Okotto

NA  18150074  L/Cpl  P Esekwe

55. They drove direct to the Federal Guard Unit in Dodan Barracks, Ikoyi,
where, in the meantime, Lt. Ezedigbo and 2/Lt. Igweze had roused additional
troops and arranged for the issue  of arms and ammunition. By the time the
troops were ready for the alleged IS operations, Major Okafor and Captain
Oji had arrived at the barracks and were at the Unit guardroom. Major Okafor
ordered that troops mount into 2 Federal Guard Landrovers detailed for the
operation by Ezedigbo

56. Federal Guard personnel detailed for this operation were the following:

NA 3785      Sgt. SA Umch

NA 18150997  Sgt.  N. Ibundu

NA 18149870  L/Cpl N. Noji

NA 3995      L/Cpl HH Okeke

NA 18149870  L/Cpl P. Nnah

NA 1706      Pte.  J. Ogu

NA 18149723  Pte.  S. Eke

NA 18141571  Pte.  I. Onoja

NA 18148787  Pte.  JF Enunehe

NA 18149970  Pte.  J  Abaye

NA 3695      Pte.  CS Dede

NA 18151261  Pte.  S. Adekunle

57. The following vehicles were used:

Landrover NA 773 – driven by Pte. I Onoja

Landrover NA 957 – driven by L/Cpl N. Noji

58. The party drove direct to the house of Brigadier Z. Mai-Malari at 11
Thompson Avenue, Ikoyi.  This is a corner house and situated at the point
where Brown road runs into Thompson Avenue.  On arrival at their
destination, the troops were dismounted and divided into three sections
commanded as shown:

No. 1 Section – Captain Oji

No. 2 Section – 2/Lt C Igweze

No. 3 Section – Sgt. SA Umch (in reserve)

59. The reserve section under Sgt. Umch was ordered to take post in a dark
place opposite the house.  The three officers, followed by their men then
entered the compound which was guarded by NCOs and men of the 2 Battalion
NA.  Major Okafor ordered the Sentry to call the Guard Commander whom he
informed that the situation was bad and that he, Okafor, had come to take
over the guard. He instructed the Guard Commander to assemble his men and to
take them back to his unit.  The Guard Commander, according to some of the
ORs interrogated, replied that he could not obey this order as he had
received no instructions to that effect.  Major Okafor and Captain Oji
overruled the Guard Commander’s objections and entered the compound

60. Whilst Major Okafor was pre-occupied with the guard the telephone in the
downstairs lounge of the Brigadier’s house started to ring.  Some of the men
present, including 2/Lt. Igweze, have stated that the Brigadier came
downstairs to answer the telephone. No sooner had he picked up the receiver
than a burst of SMG fire was heard in the compound.  This was Captain Oji
firing at a member of the Brigadier’s Guard, a L/Cpl of 2 battalion.  The
L/Cpl was killed and his body later placed into Major Okafor’s Landrover.
At the same time, L/Cpl Paul Nwekwe of 2 Brigade Signal Troop who was on
gaurd in the front of the main gate to the compound, was hit in the neck by
a bullet, thought to be a richochet.

61. Brigadier Mai-Malari, alerted to the presence of Major Okafor’s force in
his compound by Captain Oji’s burst of fire dropped the telephone and,
followed by his wife, was observed running into the boy’s quarters.  From
there he escaped into the road, and it is thought, tried to make his way to
the Federal Guard Barracks.

62. According to the ORs interrogated, Major Okafor flew into a rage when he
discovered that the Brigadier had escaped and bitterly blamed the men of the
Federal Guard for not shooting the Brigadier when they saw him running
towards the boy’s quarters.  He then ordered all present that the Brigadier
must be shot on sight.

63. Major Okafor then jumped into the landrover driven by L/Cpl Noji.  He
informed 2/Lt Igweze that he was going to get “that man” and to arrange for
more troops to come to the Brigadier’s House.  He drove around the area for
some time but failed to find the Brigadier.  By the time he returned to 11
Thompson Avenue, Major Ademoyega and Captain Adeleke had arrived there in a
landrover driven by L/Cpl D. Omeru.  Major Ademoyega had already informed
Captain Oji that the Brigadier had been killed and that he had seen his body
at the Federal Guard.  Captain Oji was overheard telling Okafor that “the
Jack had been killed”.  It is presumed that by “the Jack” Oji meant the
Brigadier. Major Okafor then informed the troops with him that Brigadier
Mai-Malari had been killed by men from another unit.

64. The time, by then, was nearly 0400 hrs.  captain Oji was ordered by
Major Okafor to proceed to 2nd Battalion in Ikeja to check the situation
there.  The Captain left in landrover NA 773 accompanied by Sgt. H. Irundu,
L/Cpl H Okeke, Pte. S. Adekunle and Pte. I Onoja.

65. As stated elsewhere in this report, Major Ifeajuna and his convoy, after
the abduction of the PM and the Finance Minister, drove towards the Federal
Guards Officers mess where he made a brief stop and then proceeded toward
Ikoyi Hotel, still with the PM in the car.  At a point in the Golf course,
adjacent to a petrol station Brigadier Mai-Malari was walking towards Dodan
Barracks when he saw Major Ifeajuna’s car.  The Brigadier recognized his
Brigade Major Ifeajuna and shouted and beckoned him to stop. Then Ifeajuna
stopped the car and accompanied by 2/Lt Ezedigbo went towards Brig.
Mai-Malari and killed him.

66. After the Brigadier had been killed, his body was loaded into the
3-Tonner and driven to the Federal Guard Officers’ Mess.


67. Although not initially alloted to Major Ifeajuna as a target for
assassination, Major Ifeajuna proceeded to Ikoyi Hotel to kill Lt. Col.
Largema.  On arrival at the hotel Major Ifeajuna told the receptionist on
duty that he had an urgent message for Lt. Col. Largema of Room 115.  The
time was between 0330 and 0400.  He then asked the hotel receptionist to
supply him with the master key which can open all doors in the hotel but was
told that this was not available.  He then ordered the receptionist to lead
him to the room in which Lt. Col. Largema was staying, warning the
receptionist on the way that he would be shot if he refused to comply with
whatever he might be ordered to do.

68. On their arrival on the first floor Major Ifeajuna, accompanied  by 2/Lt
Ezedigbo instructed the hotel receptionist to knock on the door of Lt. Col.
Largema and to inform him that he was wanted on the telephone.  It should be
pointed out here that rooms in this hotel have no telephones.  There are
situated in small alcoves in the corridors. In the case of Room 115, the
telephone alcove is only a few paces away.

69. Lt. Col Largema responded and came out dressed in pyjamas and slightly
dazed by sleep.  In the meantime the two armed soldiers had stepped back
into the corner near the lifts from where they could not be observed by Lt.
Col. Largema when he came out of his door.  The Lt. Col. then picked up the
receiver, which was off the hook.  At this moment both the soldiers near the
lift opened fire with their SMG. Lt. Col. Largema fell down and died.

70.   The killers went downstairs and called the third man to come up.
Between the three of them they then carried the dead body down the stairs
and deposited it on the floor.  They then called yet another soldier from
the Mercedes car who helped the other three to carry the body to the car.
The whole party then drove off.

71. When Major Ifeajuna and party returned to the Federal Guards Officers’
Mess he learnt that the GOC was in town and was organizing 2nd Battalion NA
at Ikeja to attack the rebels.  He was then joined by Major Okafor and they
drove off together in Major Ifeajuna’s car. At the Yaba Military Hospital
they dropped 2/Lt Ezedigbo who had been wounded in the encounter with
Brigadier Mai-Malari. The time was about 0400 hrs.  Major Ifeajuna drove
away on to the Abeokuta road.  On the way they stopped and Ifeajuna asked
the PM out of the car whence he shot and killed him.  When he and Okafor
became certain that the PM was dead they left the body in the bush at a
point beyond Otta on the Lagos to Abeokuta road.  They then opened the boot
of the car and dropped the body of Lt. Col. Largema near that of the PM.
They then drove on to Abeokuta.  On the way after Abeokuta two other
soldiers in the car were dropped and told to find their way back to Lagos
whilst Ifeajuna and Okafor proceeded to Enugu. They arrived Enugu at about
1415 hours and proceeded to the Premier’s Lodge where they held discussion
with Dr. MI Okpara, then Premier of Eastern region, after which they
separated and went into hiding. Ifeajuna eventually escaped to Ghana where
he was received by the former President Kwame Nkrumah who sent him to
Winneba to stay with SG Ikoku.

72. At the Federal Guard Officers’ Mess the corpses of Brigadier Mai-Malari,
Col. Mohammed, Lt. Col. Pam and Lt. Col. Unegbe were loaded into a 3-tonner
lorry in which was sitting Chief Okotie-Eboh still alive.  The time was then
about 0330 hours.

73. By this time Major A. Ademoyega and Major CI Anuforo were present on the
Mess premises.  Major Ifeajuna having departed, these two officers took
command of his men and vehicles.  They mounted into Major Anuforo’s Peugeot
car accompanied by 2/Lt Igweze.   Major Ademoyega entered the landrover.

74. On the instructions of Major Anuforo, the little convoy moved off with
Anuforo leading.  They traversed Lagos and went along Abeokuta road.  At a
given point, unidentifiable by the men interrogated, Major Anuforo stopped
the convoy and he, 2/Lt Igweze and Major Ademoyega left their vehicles.
They came to the tailboard of the 3-Ton truck and detailed a number of men
to take position in front and to the rear of the convoy with instructions to
stop and turn back all approaching traffic.

75. Major Anuforo then ordered the four corpses to be unloaded onto the
road.  The bodies were then carried into the bush on the left hand side of
the road. Major Anuforo then observed FS Okotie-Eboh still seated in the
truck and asked the question:  “Who is that man”?, which leads to the belief
that, until then, Anuforo was unaware of the presence of Okotie-Eboh in the
truck.  The Finance Minister replied “I am Okotie-Eboh”.  Major Anuforo then
ordered the Minister to step down. The latter complied, whereupon Major
Anuforo informed him that he was going to be shot.  The Minister commenced
to plead for his life.  This met with little or no response from Anuforo who
is reported as having confined himself to stating that he was acting under
orders. The Minister was then forced to go into the bush, pushed along by
Major Anuforo and Major Ademoyega and followed by 2/Lt Igweze and Sgt.
Ndukaife to the spot where the bodies of the 4 senior officers had been
deposited. Arriving there, without hesitation, Major Anuforo killed
Okotie-Eboh with a short burst from his SMG.

77. Major Anuforo then returned to the road followed by the others but
leaving 2/Lt Igweze, Cpl. Egwim, L/Cpl Nwankpa and Cpl. Nweke on guard over
the five bodies.

78. The convoy drove off and returned later, accompanied by 3 Ferret scout
cars which had been obtained from 2 reconnaisance Squadron at Abeokuta. Four
spades were brought out from the landrover and used to dig graves for the
burial of the corpses.  The graves were dug by Cpl. C. Egwim, Cpl Z Chukwu,
L/Cpl J Nwankpa and private N.A. Evulobi. When this task had been completed,
they all boarded their respective vehicles and drove off to Lagos.


79. These three cases have been treated jointly as they are of lesser
importance and because the officers and men involved left Apapa together in
the same vehicle

80. Although it is probable that the officers concerned in the occupation of
these vulnerable points were fully aware of the purpose of their activities
of that night, they have all denied this.  It is certain that none of the
ORs involved received any advance information on this subject.


81. After the distribution of arms and ammunition at HQ 2 Brigade, 2/Lt PN
Okocha and 2/Lt OC Anyafulu were allotted a Landrover and 3 Ors and
instructed to proceed to the P & T Exchange by Major A. Ademoyega and to
wait there until he, Ademoyega, joined them

82. They drove there and, after waiting for a very short time, Major
Ademoyega arrived in another Landrover accompanied by other officers and
men.  The Major went straight to the main door and knocked.  The door was
opened by one of the employees and Major Ademoyega, 2/Lt Okocha and 2/Lt
Anyafulu entered, accompanied by the Ors.  The Major sent the 2/Lieutenants
upstairs with orders to bring down all the workers from the Exchange, whilst
the 3 soldiers were ordered to guard the three entrance doors of the

83. When all the workers were assembled, Major Ademoyega addressed them and
ordered them not to pass any calls.  He reassured them that there was no
danger and advised them not to panic. He told them that he was leaving the
two 2/Lts and the soldiers at the Exchange to ensure that his orders were
obeyed. After speaking to the officer in charge of the exchange, Major
Ademoyega instructed the 2/Lts not to molest any of the workers leaving
instructions that they must not leave there until he, Ademoyega, returned to
collect them.

84. Neither of these officers have admitted that they took any steps to
ensure that the automatic exchange would cease to function.  An automatic
exchange does not depend upon any human agency to continue functioning and
it must, therefore, be accepted that one of these officers interfered with
the installation.

85. At 0500 hours 2/Lt Okocha complained that he was unwell and left in the
landrover that had brought them there.  2/Lt Anyafulu and the 3 ORs remained
in the exchange until about 0645 hours.  Seeing no sign of Major Ademoyega,
Anyafulu became worried.  The workers of the day shift began to arrive but
were prevented from entering by the soldiers. He then decided to return to
his unit.  He gave the soldiers some money to enable them to travel back to
Apapa by bus.  He too returned to Apapa in a commercial bus and remained in
his office until arrested.


86. After the distribution of arms and ammunition at HQ 2 Brigade, Major A.
Ademoyega ordered the following officers and ORs to enter with him into a
landrover driven by L/Cpl Umoru:

Captain GS Adeleke

2/Lt NS Wokocha

2/Lt ES Nweke

NA 18149089  Sgt. E. Ogbu – Army HQ (LGO)

NA 18150419  Cpl. H Nwegu – 1 Signal Squadron

NA  504344 Cpl. B Nwuogu – Army HQ (LGO)

NA 18150320  L/Cpl  R Ejimkonye – 1 Signal Squadron

NA 504221  Sgt. F Agonsi – 1 Signal Squadron

NA 18151015  Sgt. F. Eke – 1 Signal Squadron

NA 18150647  Cpl.  JC Iroegbulam – 1 Signal Squadron

NA 1810641  Cpl. Esonu – 1 Signal Squadron

NA 18150599  Cpl.  D. Oharuzike- 1 Signal Squadron

87. From Apapa the party drove straight to Lion Building where 2/Lt ES
Nweke, Sgt. E Ogbu, Cpl. H Nwegu, Cpl B Nwuogu and L/Cpl B Ejimkonye left
the vehicle and entered the building.  Major Ademoyega spoke to the officer
in charge and ordered him to cease receiving or transmitting all messages.
He introduced 2/Lt Nweke as the officer who would see to it that his orders
were obeyed.  Major Ademoyega and Capt. Adeleke then drove away.

88. 2/Lt. Nweke posted his men in strategic positions to prevent anyone
entering or leaving the building and remained inside the building with L/Cpl
Ejimkonye to ensure that no messages were received or transmitted. The party
remained there until 0820 hours when, in the absence of any further
instructions, 2/Lt Nweke and his men traveled to the Federal Guard Barracks
in Ikoyi by taxi.  On arrival there they were arrested.

89. There is no doubt that 2/Lt Nweke was fully aware of the fact that his
occupation of the NET was connected with the rebellion of which he was
informed at the meeting of officers late on 14 Jan 66 in Major Ifeajuna’s
house in Apapa.


90. As shown in paragraph 85 of this report, Major Ademoyega, accompanied by
2/Lts Wokocha and Nweke left HQ 2 Brigade at Approximately 0200 Hours in a
landrover driven by LCpl Umoru, which also contained 9 ORs

91. They arrived at Lion Building around 0220 hours where Major Ademoyega,
2/Lt Wokocha, Sgt. F Agonsi, Sgt. F. Eke, Cpl Iroegbulam, Cpl S. Esonu and
Cpl. D. Ohazurike left the vehicles and entered the building. Cpls Ohazurike
and Esonu were posted downstairs at the security desk.  Major Ademoyega
spoke to the policemen on duty there and told them that they were engaged on
military operations.  He ordered them not to answer the telephone nor
transmit any telephone messages. The two corporals were instructed to ensure
that the police obeyed the Major’s orders.

92. Major Ademoyega, 2/Lt Wokocha and the others then proceeded upstairs to
the Police Control Room.  Here they found 4 PCs and one WPC on duty.  A SPO,
rank not identified was also on duty there. Major Ademoyega spoke to the
police and ordered them not to receive or transmit any telephone or radio
messages.  He informed the SPO that they were engaged in military operations
and that the soldiers were there to protect the Police.

93. At approximately 0320 hours. The GOC, Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi
arrived at Lion Building in a Jaguar car.  He entered the lobby holding a
pistol in his hand and asked the two soldiers on duty what they were doing
there.  They replied that they did not know why they were there and that
they had been brought by Major Ademoyega.    They also told the GOC that
2/Lt. Wokocha and some others were upstairs.  The GOC then ordered Cpl.
Esonu to go up and to bring down the 2/Lt.     Esonu complied but could not
find the control room.  He came down again and informed the GOC of his

94. The GOC, after having asked the men to which unit they belonged, then
ordered them to return to their barracks immediately. He added that he did
not know what was happening but that he was turning out 2 Battalion to
attack the men then engaged on unlawful operations in Lagos.   After this,
the GOC left.

95. Cpl. Ohazurike then ordered Esonu to go upstairs again, accompanied by a
PC, to find 2/Lt Wokocha and to tell him of the visit of the GOC.  Esonu
complied and passed the message to 2/Lt Wokocha.  The latter then decided
that it would be wisest to comply with the GOC’s orders.  He collected all
his men and went to the Ministry of Defence where he succeeded in obtaining
transport to take the entire back to Apapa where they arrived around 0430



96.  As has already been demonstrated, Captain E. Nwobosi, OC 2 Field
Battery NNA, was taken into the confidence of the conspirators either on 13
or 14  Jan 66, whilst he was attending a Brigade Training Conference at
Apapa.  During the afternoon of 14 Jan 66, he was given a set of written
instructions by Major Ifeajuna.  It is probable that these instructions
included the arrest of the Premier and Deputy Premier of the West and an
order to bring these VIPs to the Federal Guard Officer’s Mess.  The
instruction also probably included an order to make arrangements for a 105
mm Howitzer to be brought to Lagos after the operation.  This written
instruction has not been recovered and was probably destroyed by Capt.
Nwobosi after his arrest.

97.  Capt. Nwobosi was further instructed by Major Ifeajuna to stand by his
telephone in Abeokuta to await a message giving the all clear and “H” hour.

98.  Capt. Nwobosi returned to Abeokuta, where he arrived around 1800 hrs.
Since the battery which he commanded was in the process of being formed and
had not, as yet, been supplied with vehicles, Capt. Nwobosi went to 2 Recce
Squadron, also stationed at Abeokuta, where he spoke to Capt. Remawa and
2/Lt. Orok.  He gave them a message purporting to have come from Major
Ibienu, CO 2 Recce Sqn, instructing these two officers to supply him,
Nwobosi, with one 3-Ton truck and a landrover.  Capt. Remawa agreed and
arrangements were made for the vehicles to report to Nwobosi at midnight,
with drivers. Later that evening, Capt. Nwobosi received a telephone call
from Major Ifeajuna giving him the all clear and giving “H” hour as 0200

100.  Around midnight, Capt. Nwobosi, woke up 2/Lt. A. A. O. Egbikor of his
unit and Sgt. T. Ibolegbu, the acting Battery Sergeant Major (BSM).  He
ordered the latter to turn out 25 men for IS operations and to tell the
Battery Quartermaster Sergeant (BQMS), Ambrose Chukwu, to prepare all the
Unit’s stock of small arms and ammunition for immediate issue to the men.
Although Capt. Nwobosi claims that he gave no intimation to anyone about the
night’s operations, the interrogation of the ORs involved has made it clear
that around 1930 hours he instructed certain key NCOs to stand-by for IS

101. After the men had been roused, they were issued with arms and
ammunition by the BQMS. A total of 15 SLRs and 12 Sterling SMGs were issued.
The two officers drew SLRs. When issued, each SLR magazine contained 20
rounds of ammunition, whilst each SMG magazine contained 28 rounds.

102. After the issue of arms, the men now marched to the parade ground where
they were addressed by Capt. Nwobosi who informed them that they were
proceeding to Ibadan for I.S operations. The men were then ordered to enbus.
When this was completed the vehicles contained the following personnel:

(1) Landrover

Capt: E.Nwobosi

NA 504197 BQMS A. Chukwu

NA 2630 Gnr. D. Odiachi

NA 3330 Gnr. I. Ajao

NA Gnr. S. Adefi

NA 5117 Lbdr E. Uloh

NA 5479 Gnr. R. Nwabuisi

NA 5145 Gnr. B. Akau

Driver: NA 2215 Tpr. A. Itodo (2 Recce Sqn)

(2) 3-Ton Truck

2/Lt. A.A.O. Egbikor

NA 502193 Sgt. T. Ebelegbu {acting BSM)

NA 18147640 Sgt. M.E. Ogaga

NA 4175 Gnr. G. Njeku

NA 4266 Gnr. B. Ifezue

NA 18144875 Lbdr. A. Aghar

NA 5792 Gnr. (lllegible)

NA 3208 Gnr. J. Echenim

NA 4195 Gnr. O.Onyekwe

NA 4337 Gnr. S. Ukelenye

NA 18151782 Gnr. B. Mba

NA 5498 Gnr. R. Gbongbo

NA 3094 Gnr. D. Ugbemoiko

NA 5789 Gnr. 0. Dasheet

NA 5675 Gnr. J. Gwaske

NA 4338 Gnr. s. Anukam

103. When all were seated, the convoy moved off to Ibadan. Whilst still in
Abeokuta, Capt. Nwobosi stopped to pick up a pregnant woman in labour and
take her to the nearest hospital. After this incident, the convoy continued
on its way uninterrupted, reaching Ibadan around 0200 hours as planned.

104. They drove straight to the P & T automatic telephone exchange in Agodi,
where Capt. Nwobosi and 2/Lt. Egbikor ordered all the employees to leave the
building, believing that this would stop all telephone communication in and
out of Ibadan. In the event, this was not the case, as the automatic
exchange continued to function and telephone communication continued
unimpaired throughout the night.

105. From the P&T the force drove to the Eleyele ECN Power Station. Here the
employees were ordered to stop the generators and to leave the building. A
number of the employees prevailed on Capt. Nwobosi to give them a lift into
the town. He obliged and dropped them near Dugbe Market, on his way to the
house of R.A. Fani-Kayode.

106. Arrived at the Deputy Premier’s residence, the 3- Tonner remained
outside and the landrover drove into the compound. Of two policemen on guard
at the gate, one escaped and the other was overpowered and put into the
landrover. A number of persons believed to have been thugs were seen in the
compound, but these absconded when they caught sight of the armed soldiers.

107. All the men were ordered to take up defensive positions around the
house. Capt. Nwobosi then shouted “Fani-Kayode: Come down you are for lawful
arrest by the army”. A voice from upstairs replied affirmatively to the
Captain’s summons, but nothing stirred. Nwobosi repeated his call once or
twice and eventually fired a round from his SLR into the ground. When this
failed to produce any reaction from Fani-Kayode, the Captain ordered the
following to accompany him into the house:

(1) 2/Lt. A.A.O. Egbikor

(2) BQMS A. Chukwu

(3) Gnr. I. Ajao

(4) Gnr. S. Adefi

(5) Sgt. T. Ibelegbu

108. To gain entrance, Capt. Nwobosi was compelled to break a glass panel in
the door with his SLR. He reached in, turned the key and opened the door.
The small party then entered and mounted the stairs where they found
Fani-Kayode in a bedroom. He raised his hands above his head and said “I
surrender”. Capt. Nwobosi replied “you have wasted a lot of time – we could
have shot you. This is a lawful arrest by the army”. Fani-Kayode was then
escorted downstairs and put into the landrover after his hands had been tied
together, with a rifle sling. From upstairs a-woman’s voice was heard
shouting “Don’t kill him”.

109. All the men were then assembled and mounted into their respective
vehicles. They drove straight to Premier’s Lodge, directed by Fani-Kayode.
When they arrived, they had to overpower the police guard consisting of 1
Corporal and 5 PCs. These were put into the 3- Tonner under guard. The
landrover then drove in and was parked facing the main entrance porch. At
this time the security lights were burning and the lodge emergency generator
was running.

110. The men were disposed around the building in strategic positions whilst
Capt. Nwobosi went to the generator room to switch off the lights. Whilst he
was there according to the landrover driver, Tpr. A. Itodo, a shot was
fired. It was believed that this was the shot fired by Capt. Nwobosi, which
killed the generator attendant. His body was later found with a bullet wound
in the back of the head.

111. It is known that by the time S.L. Akintola had been informed by the
wife of R.A. Fani-Kayode of what had happened by telephone. Akintola had
returned from Kaduna only a short time before the arrival of Nwobosi and his
men. He had been to the North to greet the Sardauna when the latter arrived
from Mecca. Akintola must have been further alerted by the commotion caused
by the overpowering of the police guard and the killing of the generator

112. All dispositions having been taken, Capt. Nwobosi stood in the middle
of the courtyard and shouted “Akintola come down – you are for lawful arrest
by the army on orders from HQ 2 Brigade. A voice from upstairs, presumably
that of Akintola, replied “Yes, I am coming” Nothing further happened. Capt.
Nwobosi repeated his summons a number of times without reaction from
Akintola. He then fired from his SLR one round at the building. When this
produced no result, the Captain ordered the following to accompany him into
the lodge:

(1) 2/Lt. A.A.O. Egbikor

(2) BQMS A. Chukwu

(3} Gnr. S. Adefi

(4} Gnr. I. Ajao

{5) Gnr. B. Akau

(6) Gnr. J. Gwaske

(7) LIBdr E. Uloh

113. To gain entrance, Captain Nwobosi was compelled to force the main door
to the lodge. They all entered and mounted the stairs. On the first floor
they searched a number of rooms without encountering anyone, until they came
to S.L. Akintola’s bedroom which was locked. When Nwobosi was about to force
this door, Akintola opened fire from inside the room with an SMG, shooting
through the closed door. This first burst of fire immediately wounded Gnr.
S. Adefi in the hand, 2/Lt. Egbikor in the head and Capt. Nwobosi on the
left cheek. None of the injuries were sufficiently serious to impede them.
Nwobosi and his men immediately returned the fire whilst retreating down the
stairs. They then left the house in a hurry and sought cover amongst the
flowerbeds facing the back building.

114. Two of the men, L/Bdr. Uloh and, Gnr. Ajao remained upstairs and sought
refuge in one of the other rooms. Akintola came to the room covering the
entrance porch and continued to fire at his assailants with his SMG without,
however, hitting anyone. Capt. Nwobosi ordered his men to return the fire
which they did, massively. Akintola continued firing until he ran out of

115. Around this time R.A. Fani-Kayode was heard shouting from the landrover
to Akintola urging him to surrender. Akintola, now defenceless, decided to
surrender and was next seen coming out of the front room, by Gnr. Ajao. When
Akintola saw Ajao and Uloh he raised his hand in surrender and went
downstairs. Capt. Nwobosi in the meantime, was heard shouting repeatedly
“bring him out, bring him out”.

116. Capt. Nwobosi then ordered 2/Lt. Egbikor and BQMS A. Chukwu to shoot
the Premier. These two opened fire on Akintola with their SLRs, joined,
shortly afterwards, by Nwobosi himself. S.L. Akintola fell down dead or
dying with several bullets in his body.

117. After the killing of Akintola, Capt. Nwobosi assembled his men,
released the captured policemen and drove off. This time he was joined in
the landrover by 2/Lt. Egbikor. They stopped at a roundabout near the
Central Police Station, where Capt. Nwobosi ordered Sgt. T. Ibelegbu to
proceed independently to Abeokuta with orders to collect a 105 mm Howitzer
from the battery gun park together with a team of 12 gunners, and to drive
to 2 Battalion, Ikeja. There, Ibelegbu and his party were to await the
arrival of Capt. Nwobosi.

118. On the way out of Ibadan, R.A. Fani-Kayode begged Capt. Nwobosi to be
released. The Captain refused this request and informed Fani-Kayode that he
had orders to bring him to the Federal Guard Officers’ Mess in Lagos.

119. The party drove direct to Dodan Barracks where they arrived around 0700
hours, having left Ibadan at approximately 0400 hours. On their arrival they
were all arrested.

120. The party travelling in the 3-Tonner with the 105 mm Howitzer was
arrested on arrival in 2 Battalion lines, Ikeja.


121. Major C.K. Nzeogwu of the Nigerian Military Training College (NMTC) at
Kaduna was appointed by the “inner circle” as the commander of the rebellion
in the North. The manner in which this was to be organised appears to have
been left entirely to him.

122. The record does not show that any officers, other than Major Nzeogwu,
in the North were taken into the confidence of the inner circle. It is,
however, probable that some time before the rebellion Major Nzeogwu obtained
the co-operation of Major T. Onwatuegwu and Captain G. Ude, both of the

123. Whereas in the West and in the Lagos area military movements by night
were not unusual as a result of the disturbed conditions then prevailing,
this was not the case at Kaduna. It was, therefore, necessary that a cover
be provided for the proposed rebellious activities, at the same time
creating a reason for bringing troops out of barracks by night without
alerting the senior officers of 1 Brigade to Nzeogwu’s intentions.

124. It has been established that Military night exercises in the Kaduna
area, organized by the NMTC, then under the command of Major Nzeogwu
commenced in early December 65, leading up to Exercise Damissa on 13 and 14
Jan. 66. By then the population of Kaduna and the Police were accustomed to
troop movements after dark.

125. The master plan of the inner circle made provision for the arrest of a
number of leading political personalities who were not to be killed unless
they offered resistance. This may well have been true as far as the West,
Mid-West and the East were concerned. In view of Major Nzeogwu’s activities
at the Premier’s Lodge in Kaduna, however, it is thought that this officer
had no intention of abiding by these decisions but was determined, from the
start, to kill the Premier of the North at any cost.


126. The details of exercise DAMISSA are not relevant to this report.
Suffice it to say that the night exercise of 13 Jan 66 took place in the
area of the Ministers’ quarters in Kaduna, whereas that of 14 Jan 66 was
held in the bush some 5 or 6 miles outside Kaduna along the Zaria road.

Units involved

l27. On 14 Jan 66 troops from the following units took part in Exercise

(1) 3rd Battalion NA -“C” Company

(2) N.M.T.C.

(3) No. 1 Field Squadron NAE

(4) No.2 Field Squadron NAE

(5) 1 Brigade Transport Company NASC

(6) lst Field Battery NAA

Arms and Ammunition

128. Troops proceeding on military training exercises by night or by day
were normally issued with their arms, either without ammunition or with

129. As far as can be established, this practice was first deviated from on
Jan 13 66 when, at approximately 0900 hours Major Nzeogwu handed the Acting
RQMS of the NMTC, Ssgt. J. Daramola, a list of live ammunition required for
Exercise DAMISSA.   This NCO handed the list to Cpl. E. Aiyikere, the arms
storeman, with instructions to draw this ammunition from the NMTC Magazine
at Kawo. This was done and the ammunition was issued in bulk at
approximately 1730 hours on 14 Jan 66 by Ssgt. Daramola and CMS Oko (also of

130. This list of ammunition issued is not available but it has, however,
been established that at least 6 x 84 mm projectiles for the Carl Gustav
Anti-Tank gun were issued to Sgt. Yakubu Adebiyi, an instructor in the
Tactical Wing of the NMTC. These were loaded into a landrover whilst the
bulk of the small Arms Ammunition drawn was loaded into a 3-Tonner driven by
NA/ 18266054 Pte. Clement Agbe of 1 Bde. Transport Coy. This driver
subsequently transported the ammunition to the DAMISSA exercise area.


131. Exercise DAMISSA terminated at approximately 0130 hours on 15 Jan 66.
Around that time all officers engaged in the exercise with the exception of
the officers of 1st Field Battery NAA, were called by Major Nzeogwu to
attend an “O” Group in the bush at which, they believed, the success or
otherwise of the exercise was to be discussed. Identified as present at this
discussion are the following:

(1) Major C.K. Nzeogwu       )NMTC

(2) Major T. Onwatuegwu  )NMTC

(3) Captain G. Ude ) NMTC

(4) 2/Lt. S. R. Omeruah      )3rd Bn NA – “C” Coy

(5) 2/Lt. D.K. Waribor       )

(6) Capt. B. Gbulie          )at the time in command of lst and 2nd Field
Squadron NAE

(7) 2/Lt. Ileabachi          )

(8) 2/Lt. Kpera              ) lst Field Sqn NAE

(9) 2/Lt. P. Ogoegbunam Ibik   )

(10) Lieut. E. Okafor        )

(11) 2/Lt. Ezedima           ) 2nd Field Sqn NAE

(12) 2/Lt. H.O.D. Eghagha     )

132. The officers of 1st Field Battery NAA were not called to the “O” Group
for reasons which are not altogether clear. No direct use in connection with
the rebellion was made of this Battery that night.

133. When all the officers were assembled, Major Nzeogwu addressed then on
the subject of the rapidly deteriorating political and security situation in
the Federation. He claimed that a stage had been reached at which the
politicians should be told to quit. To accomplish this, he announced, the
army had decided to take over power by force of arms. He compared the
incomes of the politicians with those of Nigerian workers and urged the
officers to support the rebellion. He further announced that the revolt was
taking place simultaneously in all regional capitals and at Lagos and that,
therefore, they need fear no repercussions as a result of the activities in
which they were about to participate that night. It would appear that none
of these present raised a dissenting voice. In fact, their subsequent
actions showed, in most cases, enthusiastic support for the plan.

134. Major Nzeogwu then proceeded to issue set tasks to each officer
present. Events have shown that, subsequently, last minute changes in these
plans were made. The tasks allotted have been established as follows:

Occupation of Vulnerable Points

135. The officer in over-all charge of this part of the operation was Capt.
B. Gbulie. He claimed to have distributed tasks as shown below on the spur
of the moment:

(1) Ammunition Service Depot (ASD) -2/Lt. Ileabachi

(2) P & T Telephone Exchange       -2/Lt. P. Ogoegbunam Ibik

(3) N.B.C. House                   -2/Lt. Kpera

(4) BCNN Radio & TV Station        -2/Lt. Ezedima

(5) State House                    -2/Lt. Okafor

(6) Road Blocks on Kachia Road near PMF Barracks -2/Lt. Eghagha

136. In addition, Capt. Gbulie was instructed to rouse the following
officers to inform them of what was taking place and to ask for support:

(1) Capt. P. Anakwe – 1 Bde Staff Capt. “A”

(2) Major A.A. Keshi – Brigade Major

(3) Capt. L. Dillibe – 1 Bde Staff Capt. “Q”

(4) Lieut. J.C. Ojukwu – 1 Recce Squadron NA

(5) Lieut. Ikeachor

(6} Lieut. Mohammed Eandiya

Capt. Gbulie    has stated under interrogation that he complied with this
order and caused these officers to foregather at HQ 1 Bde where he informed
them of the situation.

137. As far as has been established, the following officers were then
detailed for tasks as shown:

(1) Assassination of Alh Sir Ahmadu Bello

Major C.K. Nzeogwu

2/Lt. K.D. Waribor

2/Lt. S.E. Omeruah

Capt. G. Ude

(2) Assassination of Brigadier S. Ademulegun

Major T. Onwatuegwu

(3) Assassination of Colonel R.A. Shodeinde

2/Lt. K.D. Waribor

(4) Abduction of Sir Kashim Ibrahim

Major T. Onwatuegwu

(5)  Abduction of Makaman Bida – Regional Finance Minister

Major C.K. Nzeogwu

138. After the officers had been briefed they were sent to join their men
and to proceed immediately with the execution of the tasks allotted to them.
It is not clear whether or not Major Nzeogwu instructed the officers to
inform their men of what was afoot. It is certain that the men of 3rd
Battalion who were to be used for the attack of the Premier’s Lodge were not
briefed. It is equally certain that Capt. Gbulie addressed all the men of
the Engineers under his command and spoke to them along the lines in which
Major Nzeogwu had briefed the officers.

139. Immediately after the “O” Group, senior NCOs of all units represented
were sent to the 3~Tonner containing the ammunition and order to draw
ammunition for their men. In the case of the “C” company this raised a
problem. The men believed the exercise to be finished and a number of them
queried the reason why they should be issued with live ammunition. This was
explained to them by 2/Lt. Waribor who told them that they were proceeding
on Internal Security Operations.

140. After the issue of ammunition had been completed, the entire force left
the exercise area and proceeded to its allotted targets.

141. The following officers and ORs have been identified as having been
involved in the attack on the Premier’s Lodge:


(1) Major C .K. Nzeogwu – NMTC

(2) 2/Lt. K.D. Waribor – “C” Coy, 3rd BN NA

(3) 2/Lt. S.E. Omeruah – “

(4) Capt. G. Ude

Other ranks

(1) NA 18147406 Sgt. Husa Kanga – NMTC

(2) NA l8149900  Sgt Yakubu Adebiyi  – NMTC

(3) Sgt Duromola Oyegoke . NMTC

(4) NA 5888 Pte. Ogbole Agwu – 3rd Bn NA

(5) NA 2405 Pte Bello Mbulla  – 3rd Bn NA

(6) NA 18151763 L/Cpl . Samuel Amajo – 3rd Bn NA

(7) NA 18151319 L/Cpl  Danyo Mbulla – 3rd Bn NA

(8) NA 5684     Pte. Abu Odiedier – 3rd Bn NA

(9) NA 18148998 Pte  Lekoja Gidan-Jibrin – 3rd Bn NA

(10) NA 163287   Cp1. Bako Lamundo   – 3rd Bn NA

(11) NA 5860 Pte. Joseph Wadu Goji -3rd Bn NA

(12) NA 1982 Pte. Alexander Agbe – 3rd Bn NA

(13) NA 18151864 Pte Lagwin Goshit – 3rd Bn NA

(14) NA 18266006 Pte Augustine Oguche Agbo – 3rd Bn NA

(15) NA 634212   Pte Effiong Atkinson – 3rd Bn NA

(16) NA 18147284 Cpl. Tunana Bangir – 3rd Bn NA

(17) NA 18l49368 Cpl. Abibo Elf – 3rd Bn NA

(18) NA 18151873 Pte. Uguman Monogi – 3rd Bn NA

(19) NA 1562 Pte Felako Kwa – 3rd Bn NA

(20) NA 18149363 Cpl. Reuben Nwagwugwu – 3rd Bn NA

(20) NA 502542 Cpl. Yakubu Kaje – 3rd Bn NA

(21) NA 505092 L/Cpl. Mamis Hundu – 3rd Bn NA

(22) NA 18151861 L/Cpl Thaddens Thamyil Tsenyi1 – 3rd Bn NA

(23) NA l8148269 L/Cpl Issna1m Tayapa – 3rd Bn NA

(24) NA 18148272 L/Cpl Ali Shendam – 3rd Bn NA

(25) NA 18151771 Pte. Usuman Gabure – 3rd Bn NA

(26) NA 18149613 Pte Emmanue1 Ekwueme – 3rd Bn NA

(27) NA 4887 Pte Erastus Nakito – 3rd Bn NA

(29) NA 3659 Pte Jonathan Anahiri – 3rd Bn NA

142. When this force left the DAMISSA exercise area, it was led by Major
Nzeogwu who was travelling in a landrover accompanied by a driver and two
OR’s. He was followed by another landrover containing Sgts. Adebiyi, Manga
and Oyegoke who were armed with two 84mm Carl Gustav Anti-Tank Guns and 6

143. Following this were a number of other vehicles, landrovers and 3-Tonner
containing 2/Lts. Waribor and Omeruah and troops from “C” Coy 3rd BN NA.

144. On arrival at the main gate to the compound, Major Nzeogwu found 4 PCs
on guard in front of the gate. They were the following:

(1) No.8301 L/Cpl. Musa Nimzo

(2) No. 10674 PC. Akpan Anduka

(3) No. 18913 PC Hagai Lai

(4)     No. 18920 PC Peter Attah

145. Major Nzeogwu, who was armed with a sterling SMG, ordered the
constables to face the wall. Attah complied with this order but the three
others refused. Without further ado, Major Nzeogwu immediately opened fire
on them with his SMG killing all three on the spot.

146. Immediately after the killing of the policemen, Major Nzeogwu ordered
the two men with the guns and the 3 NMTC Sergeants to follow him into the
compound, bringing with them the Carl Gustav guns and the projectiles for
these weapons.

147. Immediately inside the compound, Major Nzeogwu stationed the Carl
Gustavs some 10 yards apart facing the lodge. The gunners were Sgts. Oyegoke
and Manga, whilst Sgt. Adebiyi acted as ammunition number. As soon as both
guns had been loaded, Major Nzeogwu ordered the NCOs to open fire at the
Lodge. Both fired their projectiles bursting inside the ground floor rooms
of the building. Sgt. Adebiyi stated that he then ran towards Sgt. Manga to
help this NCO reload. Whilst he was with Manga he heard Major Nzeogwu
shouting repeatedly “Fire you bastard, fire”. Immediately after this both
Manga and Adebiyi heard a burst of SMG fire. They turned round and observed
Sgt. Oyegoke slumped on the ground bleeding from multiple wounds. It was
clear to both that their colleague had been killed by Major Nzeogwu either
for refusing to obey or because he attempted to run away.

143. After the killing of Oyegoke, Major Nzeogwu ordered Sgt. Adebiyi to
take over Oyegoke’s gun and to continue firing at the house. Both Adebiyi
and Manga, frightened by Oyegoke’s killing, continued to fire as ordered.
They used a total of 5 projectiles. As a result the building caught fire.

149. Whilst all this was happening, 2/Lts. Waribor and Omeruah had arrived
with the men from 3rd BN who were rapidly deployed around the outer
perimeter wall of the lodge. Although these men heard the bursting of the
Carl Gustav projectiles, the SMG and SLR fire and the screaming of women and
children inside the compound, they were in no position to observe what was

150. 2/Lt. Waribor, whilst deploying his men, instructed them to shoot
anyone they observed attempting to leave the compound. A number of
civilians, including women, however, were seen running and crying and Major
Nzeogwu firing at them with his SMG.

151. NA 502342 Cpl. Yakubu Kaje of 3rd BN NA reports that, at a given
moment, he observed a civilian coming out of the Lodge armed with a sword.
The corporal and the men with him stopped the civilian and ordered him to
drop the sword. At this moment, according to the corporal, Major Nzeogwu
arrived on the scene and asked the civilian, in Hausa, for the whereabouts
of the “master of the house”. The man replied that he did not know,
whereupon Major Nzeogwu threatened to kill him unless he led him to his
master. The man then agreed and led Major Nzeogwu to the back of the
building. A shortwhile afterwards, the corporal states, he heard a number of
shots fired. Assuming that Kaje is telling the truth, it is probable that
the Sardauna of Sokoto died at that moment.

152. Cpl. Kaje has further reported that when the firing ceased, Major
Nzeogwu came from the compound and was met at the gate by 2/Lt. Waribor, who
asked the Major: “Did you get the man?”, to which Nzeogwu answered, “Yes”.
When Major Nzeogwu left the compound he stated for all to hear, exultantly,
“I have been successful, he is dead”.

153. It has not been possible to establish the circumstances in which the
senior wife of the deceased Premier was killed. The same applies to the
death of one Zaruni, the Premier’s personal body-guard. It is presumed that
they died at the same time as the Premier.

154. With regards to the killing of Ahmed Ben Musa, Senior Assistant
Secretary (Security) in front of the Lodge, none of the men interrogated has
admitted to having witnessed this. Ahmed Ben Musa was shot dead in his car
by a number of unidentified soldiers, having arrived at the Premier’s Lodge
after being alerted by the police. Presumably the soldiers had ordered Musa
to drive away but he could not do so for some unexplained reason. They then
killed him.


155. The following have been identified as having been involved in the
killing of this senior officer and his wife at No.1, Kashim Ibrahim Road,
Kaduna at approximately 0200 hours on 15 January 1966:-

(1) Major Timothy Onwatuegwu (NMTC)

(2) NA 18265005 Spr. Yakubu Dungo 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(3) NA 18266079 L/Cpl . Lawrence Akuma 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(4)    Spr. Raphael O1atunde 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(5) James Aluta 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(6) Emmanuel Udo 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(7) Simon Agi 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(8) Felix 0. {Snu) 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE {now NMTC)

(9) L/Cpl . Mu1i {Snu) 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE {now NMTC)

(10) NMT Cp1. Yakubu Bako 1 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(11) Spr. Mathew Asanya  1 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(12) Joseph Odion   1 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(13) Spr. Henry Valia 1 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(14) NA 18149929 Pte. Geofrey Eborendu 1 Bde. Tpt Coy NASC

156. After the briefing at the DAMISSA “O” Group by Major Nzeogwu at 0130
hours l5 Jan 66, Major Onwatuegwu entered a landrover driven by No. NA
18149929 Pte. G. Eberandu of Bde. Tpt. Coy. With the exception of L/Cpl.
Lawrence Akuma all the men mentioned were made to enter this vehicle and
another landrover.

157. Before leaving the exercise area these men drew ammunition from the
3-Tonner already referred to in this report. They had already been briefed
as what was expected from them that night by Capt. Gbulie, the OC. The two
vehicles then moved off to the junction of the Lagos Zaria roads where they
stopped. Here the men from one of the landrovers were transferred to a
3-Tonner whilst the empty landrover containing only the driver and L/Cpl.
Muli was dispatched to the Air Force Base by Major Onwatuegwu.

158. When L/Cpl. Muli returned, the convoy, now consisting of 2 landrovers
and one 3-Tonner, proceeded to the residence of Brigadier Ademulegun. At
some distance from the house, variously estimated at between 100 and 400
yards, all three vehicles stopped. Major Onwatuegwu ordered a section of men
under L/Cpl. Muli to accompany him towards the house.

159. The Brigadier’s house was guarded by L/Cpl. Lawrence Akuma and three
sappers of 2 Field Squadron NAE. When the Major and his party arrived,
L/Cpl. Akuma and the two sappers were on the verandah of the house whilst
one sapper was patrolling the grounds. The latter challenged Major
Onwatuegwu when he approached. He was disarmed and escorted to the house
where he was made to join the guard commander and the other two members of
the guard. They were all placed in the custody of a number of soldiers.

160. Major Onwatuegwu, accompanied by a number of soldiers entered the
house. A short while after this, the guard heard several shots fired
upstairs after which the Major and his men returned. The guard were placed
into the 3-Tonner truck and driven to HQ 1 Brigade where they remained until
released in the morning.


161. The only persons positively identified as having been involved in the
murder of this senior officer are the following:-

(l) Major C.K. Nzeogwu – NMTC

(2) Major T. Onwatuegwu – NMTC

(3) Lieut. G.E. Nwokedi – NMTC

162. It will be recalled that at the briefing by Major Nzeogwu, it was 2/Lt.
Waribor who was allotted the task of killing the Colonel, after the attack
on the Premier’s Lodge 2/Lt. Waribor has stated that after the completion of
his task at the Premier’s Lodge, he was ordered by Major Nzeogwu to effect
the arrest of Makaman Bida before proceeding to Col. Shodeinde’s residence.
He was unable to do so, because he did not know the address of the Colonel,
and therefore, returned to Brigade Headquarters.

163. Mrs. Shodeinde has stated that at approximately 0300 hours on Jan 15.
66 she heard the sound of three vehicles stopping in front of her house.
Immediately afterwards she heard a voice which she identified as that of
Major Nzeogwu, calling her husband’s name. The Colonel was fast asleep. She
left her bed and switched on the lights. As she did so, the men outside
started to shoot at the doors and windows of the house and she was
immediately wounded in the left hand. The door then flew open and about ten
soldiers rushed into the room. Amongst these she identified Major Nzeogwu,
Major Onwatuegwu and Lieut. Nwokedi.

164. By this time the Colonel was awake and sitting up in bed. Mrs.
Shodeinde started to cry and beg for her life. Nzeogwu assured her that they
had not come to kill her but her husband the Colonel. When she continued
shouting, the other soldiers shot at her legs, wounding her several times.

165. Major Nzeogwu and the others then commenced firing at the Colonel
whilst still in bed, who fell down dead or dying by the side of the bed.
Mrs. Shodeinde then fled from the room and ran for shelter to the servant’s
quarters where she remained until the attackers left.


166. This abduction was accomplished by the persons involved in the
assassination of Brigadier S. Ademulegun. Their names are, therefore, not
repeated here.

167. After killing the Brigadier, Major Onwatuegwu ordered his men to
re-enter their vehicles and drove straight to the Governor’s residence. On
arrival a number of men were deployed around the house whilst the Major
entered accompanied by a number of unidentified soldiers.

168. The house was then being guarded by the following police constables:-

(1) No.11258 PC Benson Sihindatiya

(2) No.185   ”  Yohana Garkawa

(3) No.1391  ”  Johnson Lamurde

(4) No.18909 ”  Warzar

169. At approximately 0245 hours Major Onwatuegwu and his party reached the
residence, according to PC Lamurde. The Major was then in the landrover. The
first landrover containing some 7 men stopped. The man jumped out and
overpowered the PC on duty. The Major then entered the building.

170. Whilst the Major and his party were inside, the military personnel who
remained outside the building heard a burst of SMG fire. It is certain that
this burst of SMG fire killed PC Yohana Garkawa. PC Sihindatiya was disarmed
by 4 soldiers and dragged to the police guard room where he saw the dead
body of PC Garkawa. The soldiers pointed at the body and said “Do you see
your brother?”. They then instructed him to lead them to the bedroom of the
Governor. When he stated that he did not know where the Governor was
sleeping they threatened to kill him. By that time, however, the Governor
had been found by other soldiers reaching the residence. He was brought out
and made to enter the 3-Tonner and was driven to HQ 1 Brigade.

171. Simultaneously with the Governor, his two ADC’s Messrs. Noman Dikwa and
Garba Lango, were abducted and driven to 1 Bde HQ in the landrover
containing Major Onwatuegwu.


172. This attempted abduction (or assassination) failed because the Minister
was not in his house that night, having traveled to Bida, his home town, the
previous day. The incident is, however, worth reporting, because during the
search of the Minister’s residence one man, Ahmadu Pategi, a Government
driver, was killed by Lieut. Waribor who mistook him for the Minister.

173. Among those taking an active part in this incident the following have
been identified:-

(1) 2/Lt. Waribor – NMTC (other names are illegible)

174. After the completion of the operation at the Premier’s Lodge, 2/Lt.
Waribor met Major Nzeogwu near the main entrance to the lodqe. The Major had
been wounded during the attack and had bloodstains on the right side of his
face and his shirt. The Major ordered Waribor to take his platoon to the
house of Makaman Bida, to arrest the Minister and to take him to Brigade

175. Waribor complied with the order, and drove straight to the Minister’s
house. On arrival he deployed his men around the house and called in a loud
voice upon the Minister to surrender. This brought no reaction so he forced
open the door with the intention of searching the house. At this moment
Major Nzeogwu arrived. The Major ordered Waribor to search the ground floor
whilst he, accompanied by a number of men from 3rd Brigade NA went upstairs.

176. Waribor’s search downstairs proved fruitless. He collected about 3
house servants and questioned them as to the whereabouts of their master.
They claimed that the Minister had traveled to Bida and was returning in the
morning. Whilst he was questioning the servants outside the house, Waribor
observed a man running from the house with his face covered. Believing this
to be the Minister, Waribor fired at the man and killed him. He then went to
the body, and after removing the cloth from the man’s face, found that he
was mistaken. It was later established that the body was that of Ahmadu
Pategi, a Government driver attached to the Minister.

177. Major Nzeogwu, having failed to find the Minister upstairs then came
down and enquired from Waribor why he had fired his SMG. Waribor explained
after which Nzeogwu ordered him to accompany him to the house of Colonel
Shodeinde, who according to the plan was to be killed that night. The Major
then drove off before Waribor had a chance to assemble his men and to mount
into the vehicles. Since Waribor did not know Col. Shodeinde’s address and
the Major had departed without him, he had no choice but to return to
Brigade Headquarters.


178. This was carried out by the officers named in paragraph 135 of this
report without producing any incident of interest to this enquiry. 2/Lt.
H.O.D. Eghagha whose task it was to set up a road block on the Kachia Road
near the Police Mobile Force Barracks was instructed to prevent the PMF from
travelling into Kaduna. This, it is thought, implied that he and his men
were to attack the PMF should they move out in strength. It has been
established, however, that 2/Lt. Eghagha instructed his men not to molest
the PMF as these were too few in number to affect materially the rebellious
operations of that night. It is a fact that the majority of the Northern PMF
were, at that time, serving in Western Nigeria.


179. Although not directly involved in any of the incidents reported on in
this document, there is no doubt that the Nigerian Air Force played a
comparatively important role in the rebellion under the command of 2/Lt.
Godfrey Ikechukwu Amuchienwa of the Military Training and Security Squadron
NAF at Kaduna.

NOTE: At this point the (incomplete) report ends.



ACRONYMS: If you have any questions about some of the acronyms used in the
report please contact me by email at nowa@prodigy.net

SPELLINGS: Please excuse some of the spelling errors. The original documents
from which these were culled had a few areas that were not very legible

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